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Audit Quality, Earnings Quality and the Cost of Equity Capital 
Abstract 
We investigate the influence of audit quality on the relation between earnings quality 
and cost of equity capital. We utilize total accruals as a measure of earnings quality 
and auditor choice, auditor effort and auditor opinion based audit quality proxies used 
in the prior literature for audit quality dimensions to estimate a cost of equity model 
for a sample of firm years where auditing and audit quality is likely to be in higher 
demand. We find that higher audit quality is associated with significant mitigation of 
the positive relation between total accruals and the cost of equity capital and the 
presence of a qualified audit opinion issued by the auditor increases the extent to 
which lower quality accruals are associated with an increased cost of equity capital. 
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1. Introduction 
The organisation of contracts in firms between managers, shareholders and others 
creates conditions for audits to contribute significant value where the contracts are 
reliant on accounting information to allocate contract payoffs (see e.g. Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, Watts and Zimmerman 1986). From the demand side investors 
demand audits to reduce information asymmetry around the accounting information 
supplied by the firm and auditors invest in supplying audit quality in response to that 
demand and earn returns for doing so. Regulatory changes in the wake of high profile 
corporate collapses addressing the role of audits in the financial reporting process 
have further focussed the attention of markets, firms and investors on deriving value 
from audits. In this study we investigate the economic influence of audit quality on 
the relation between earnings quality and cost of equity capital to determine whether 
high quality external auditing contributes significant value to firms by lowering the 
cost of their financing for equity capital. 
Our examination is premised on the assumption that observable attributes of audited 
financial data reflect the fact that financial statements are a joint product of 
management representations and the audit process. Hence, while the quality of the 
reported earnings and the quality of the audit are discrete properties, it also follows 
that judgements about earnings quality will be influenced by the perceived level of 
audit quality attached to the reported earnings. Following arguments linking 
information quality with the cost of capital (Easley and O'Hara 2004; Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2005), we expect that identifiable measures of higher audit quality will 
mitigate the effect of lower earnings quality on the cost of equity capital. Evidence of 
this effect can contribute to our understanding of how markets reward or penalize 
accounting quality in light of the process by which observable properties of 
accounting arise. This provides new insights into the value investors place on audit 
quality dimensions in contributing to the quality of the earnings and addresses the call 
for evidence on the value of auditing to investors (Healy and Palepu 2001 ). 
The literature linking earnings quality to cost of capital is limited. Francis et a!. 
(FLOS 2004) examine the relation between the cost of equity capital and seven 
earnings attributes, and find that firms with the least favourable values of each 
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attribute experience a larger cost of equity capital. 1 In particular, they find that a 
measure of accrual quality based on the mapping of accruals into cash flows (Dechow 
and Dichev 2002) has the largest effect on the cost of equity capital after controlling 
for the innate determinates of earnings quality. FLOS (2005) further examine the 
relation between this measure of accrual quality and the cost of debt and equity capital 
and show that poorer earnings quality increases information risk and leads to a higher 
cost of debt and equity capital. Using a sample of Australian firm-years between 1997 
and 2006, Wong (2008) conducts a study similar to FLOS (2004). After examining 
ten different concepts/dimensions of earnings quality he concludes that the strongest 
association with cost of equity capital is for a simple measure of total accruals. 2 
In each of these studies, the effect of earnings quality on the cost of capital is 
examined independent of any effect that actual or perceived variation in audit quality 
could have on the earnings quality and cost of capital. However, the accrual properties 
utilized to proxy for earnings quality in these studies are likely to reflect management 
opportunism as evidenced in the (unobservable) unaudited financial statements, as 
well as the extent of any mitigation resulting from the audit process. While the 
possibility of opportunism exacerbates information risk, higher audit quality is 
expected to mitigate information risk. If characteristics of audited financial data 
reflect the quality of auditing as well (i.e., the joint product hypothesis), then we 
expect that higher audit quality helps to disentangle these effects. 
A higher quality audit increases the chances of detecting questionable accounting 
practices, constraining overstated earnings and revealing misrepmting (Francis 2004). 
In turn, with the assurance of high audit quality, accruals are more likely to capture 
performance measurement rather than opportunism. Higher audit quality can mitigate 
concerns over unusual accruals (however measured) being opportunistically 
motivated. The perception of lower information risk is expected to be transformed 
into a tangible benefit for firms with high quality audits in the form of a lowering of 
the cost of equity capital attributed to the earnings quality. 
1 FLOS (2004) identifY seven earnings attributes i.e., accrual quality, persistence, predictability, 
smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. 
2 Wong (2008) utilizes ten earnings quality concepts i.e., total accruals, unexpected accruals, cash-to-
profit, accruals quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, relevance, conservatism and timeliness. 
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Several papers report evidence of a direct relation between various dimensions of 
audit quality and the cost of equity capital (Khurana and Raman 2004, 2006; Li and 
Stokes 2008; Hope eta!. 2008; Ahmed eta!. 2008; Fernando eta!. 2008). They show 
that audit quality matters to investors with companies appointing brand name auditors. 
and auditors (Big n, industry specialists) delivering more effort (proxied by higher 
unexpected audit fees) lowering the companies' cost of equity capital. Similar 
findings with various audit quality proxies have emerged in investigations of the cost 
of debt capital (Blackwell, Noland and Winters, 1998, Pittman and Fortin 2004, 
Mansi, Maxwell and Miller, 2004) whereby higher audit quality is associated with a 
lower cost of debt capital. 
None of these audit quality studies controls for earnings quality. Research showing 
that higher audit quality is associated with higher earnings quality (e.g., Becker et a!. 
1998; Francis eta!. 1999; Balsam eta!. 2003; Caramanis and Lennox 2007) leaves 
open the question whether higher audit quality proxies at least in part for higher 
earnings quality in the demonstrated associations between audit quality dimensions 
and the cost of equity capital. Hribar et a!. (2008) go so far as to characterize a 
measure of unexpected audit fees as a "new" measure of accounting quality, although 
they argue that higher unexpected audit fees are a reflection of lower quality 
accounting. Such conclusions miss an important point that otherwise observable 
properties of accounting are a result of the extra audit work, and so although 
additional audit effort could reflect underlying concerns with the accounting systems, 
the result of that extra work is likely to be higher quality accounting, rather than lower 
quality accounting. 
This study draws these two streams of literature together to examme the joint 
attributes of earnings quality and audit quality on equity pricing. The study starts from 
the premise that financial statements are a joint product of management 
representations and the audit process. Hence, accruals utilised in prior earnings 
quality studies are subject to variation in audit quality. While managers have 
incentives to 'adjust' earnings to maximize firm and/or manager wealth, high quality 
auditing is more likely to detect questionable accounting practices, constrain 
overstated earnings and reveal misreporting. Auditing of the financial statements 
reduces information asymmetries between firm insiders and shareholders. High 
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quality auditing could enhance confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting 
and temper investors' concerns with information risk attached to otherwise perceived 
poor earnings quality. 
We employ the industry adjusted earnings-price ratio approach of FLOS (2005) to 
estimate the cost of equity capital for a sample of Australian companies. This 
approach to estimating the cost of equity capital is also utilised by Wong (2008) and 
Li and Stokes (2008) in their respective assessments of accounting and audit quality 
effects on the cost of equity capital using an Australian setting. Consistent with 
Wong's (2008) extensive investigation of alternative earnings quality proxies, total 
accruals are used as our proxy for earnings quality. We consider separately the four 
dimensions of audit quality found by Li and Stokes' (2008) to be directly associated 
with the cost of equity capital (i.e., auditor brand name, industry specialization, 
auditor effort, and audit qualifications). 
Switches from non-Big n to Big n auditors is a widely used indicator of choice of a 
higher quality auditor (see e.g, Johnson and Lys, 1991 and Francis, 2004). Switching 
to a brand name auditor signals that the firm seeks more credibility to be attached to 
its accounting choices (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). Industry leadership has 
also been used as an indicator of higher audit quality (see e.g., Craswell et al,. 1995) 
and more recently industry leadership at the city level as distinct from the national 
level has been shown to be the key indicator of industry expertise (Francis et al. 1999; 
Reynolds and Francis 2001; Ferguson et al. 2003). Industry specialist auditors have 
also been shown to be associated with less earnings management (Krishnan, 2003; 
Balsam et al. 2003). If investors perceive audit quality to be higher when a firm 
chooses to switch to Big n audit firm or uses an industry specialist auditor and they 
perceive as a consequence that lower information risk is attached to higher accruals 
based earnings, this could lower the cost of equity capital. 
Higher than expected audit fees has been used to indicate greater audit quality 
supplied through greater audit effort (see e.g, Beatty, 1989). Earnings quality is also 
shown to be higher when auditors deliver more audit effort which increases the 
probability of detecting potential errors, frauds and misstatements in the accounts 
(Caramanis and Lennox, 2007). In such circumstances, higher accruals based earnings 
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are more likely to be perceived by investors as indicators of better firm performance. 
In the presence of greater audit effort, there could be a lowering of the perceived 
information risk of higher accruals based earnings and this could lower the cost of 
equity capital. 
Finally, information risk of higher accruals based earnings could be higher if a 
qualified audit opinion accompanies the higher accruals based earnings. In such cases, 
investors are more likely to price protect themselves from perceived risk of 
management opportunism provided by the signal that there are issues with the 
accounts discovered by the auditor or there have been issues in conducting their audit 
which have prevented the auditor from completing the audit required and this could 
increase the cost of equity capital attached to the accruals based earnings. 
In the case of each audit quality dimension, we examine interactive effects of earnings 
quality and audit quality on the cost of equity capital for those Australian companies 
where audit quality is likely to be in greater demand by shareholders for monitoring 
the quality of the accounting. Following prior literature (e.g., Francis eta!. 2005; Liu 
and Wysocki, 2008), loss firms are excluded from the sample due to the difficulty of 
interpreting a negative earning-price ratio and the non-linearity in the distribution of 
negative and positive earnings-price ratio. Further to this reason for exclusion, prior 
research (e.g., Hayn 1995; Collins et a!. 1999) also demonstrates that the earning 
numbers have low information content for loss making companies. Moreover, in 
Australia, the prevalence of losses is much higher, most commonly for smaller firms, 
many of which are involved in the mining industry (Balkrishna et a!. 2007) where 
auditing and audit quality has been demonstrated to be less important as a monitoring 
mechanism (Lee, Stokes, Taylor and Walter, 2003). 
We find that audit quality contributes to incrementally lowering the cost of capital for 
firms with earnings that are classified as having relatively low earnings quality. 
Specifically, switching to a Big N auditor and very high levels of external audit effort 
mitigate the positive relation between cost of equity capital and higher total accruals. 
For firms that receive a qualified audit opinion, the perceived risk around the higher 
accruals is increased, which incrementally increases the cost of equity capital. 
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Importantly, these interaction effects are in addition to the stand alone audit quality 
effects on the cost of equity capital documented by Li and Stokes (2008). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research 
design. The results are presented in section 3 and section 4 provides conclusions. 
2. Research design 
2.1 Cost of equity capital model 
Following the approach of FLOS (2005) and Wong (2008), this study utilizes an 
earnings-price ratio as the cost of equity capital measure. This approach is adopted 
because the PE ratio is a popular means of estimating rate of return in the equity 
market, and is a widely quoted measure (Easton 2004). An EP ratio is used to address 
the concerns of small values of earnings in the denominator (FLOS 2005). Also, as 
noted by FLOS (2005), the ratio is industry-adjusted because Alford (1992) finds that 
industry membership works well for selecting firms that are comparable in terms of 
risk and growth.3 Consistent with FLOS (2005), only firms with positive earnings are 
included because of the difficulties in interpreting a negative EP ratio in terms of cost 
of equity capital. FLOS (2005) calculate industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio (JndEP) 
using a median EP first calculated for all firms with positive earnings in a given year 
in each GICS industry. A minimum of five positive earnings (excluding the firm}) in 
an industry is required. lndEP1.1 is then calculated as the difference between the firm 
j's EP and its median industry EP in year t. 
The effects of the audit quality dimension interactions with earnings quality are tested 
by estimating several cross sectional regression models that allow for interaction of 
the audit quality dimensions (AQIR to indicate information risk attached to the audit 
quality dimension) and the accruals based earnings quality dimension (EQ). The basic 
model is outlined as follows: 
3 Using raw EP data produced qualitatively the same results. Moreover, when IndEP is used to create 
ranked decile portfolios and all tests are repeated, the results are similar. These results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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IndEP1,, = j30 + j31 Growth1,~ + j32Leverage1,, + j33Beta1,, + j3,Size1_, + j3,EQ1,, 
+ j3,AQIR1 ,~ + j3,EQ1,, * AQIR1 ,~ + s 1,, 
In this model, the coefficient of the interaction term (J37) and its significance indicates 
whether and how an audit quality dimension influences the relation between earnings 
quality and the cost of equity capital. The average effect of earnings quality on the 
cost of equity capital is measured by f3s and /37, while the effect of audit quality is 
measured by /36 and /37• The model includes controls for growth, leverage, beta and 
firm size consistent with FLOS (2005) and Wong (2008). Growth is defined as the log 
of one plus a firm's growth in value of equity (sourced from AspectHuntleys data 
base, item 7010) over the past five years. A negative sign is predicted because higher 
equity growth could lead the market to expect high earnings growth in the future 
(FLOS, 2005). Leverage is defined as total debt (AspectHuntleys item 6040) divided 
by total assets (AspectHuntleys item 5090). Greater financial leverage is expected to 
result in higher risk, and therefore, a positive relationship is expected. Beta is 
calculated from the firm-specific CAPM using 36 month rolling returns, and a 
minimum of seven monthly returns are required. The capital asset pricing model 
suggests that a stock market beta will positively correlate with cost of equity capital. 
Size is estimated as the log of a firm's total assets (Aspect item 5090). Prior studies 
(e.g., Brennan and Subrahamanyam, 1996; Gebhardt eta!. 2001; Fama and French 
1992) note that large firms have more available information and are more liquid than 
small firms. Hence, a negative sign is predicted because of the lower risk of large 
firms. 
Three additional reduced form regression models with AQIR alone (labelled Eq. 1 ), 
EQ alone (labelled Eq.2) and both AQIR and EQ included (labelled Eq.3), are 
respectively estimated along with the full model (labelled as Eq. 4). 4 Eq. (1) 
establishes the baseline audit quality and cost of equity capital relationship for the 
sample used in our study after matching the available EQ data with the AQIR 
measures. Eq. (2) establishes the baseline earnings quality and cost of equity capital 
4 Eq. (!)to (3) could be summarized as follows, 
IndEP1.,:::::: /30 + j3,Growth 1.1 + j32Leverage J,r + j33Beta1 ,1 + f34Si=e1,1 + j35 AQIR1,, +&1,1 
IndEP,.~ = {30 + j31Growth 1,, + j32 Leverage 1,1 + j33Beta J.r + f34 Si=e ;,r + j35EQ1,, + s 1,1 
lndE~, ~ /3, + fJprowth1_, + [J,Leverage1,, + fJ3Beta1_, + fJ,Size1_, + fJ5EQ1, + [J,AQIR1,, +eN 
Eq. (!) 
Eq. (2) 
Eq. (3) 
9 
relationship for our sample. Eq. (3) examines the additive effect of earnings quality 
and audit quality without the interaction across the two information risk factors. It 
also addresses the robustness of the findings of Li and Stokes (2008) after controlling 
for the earnings quality factor in the model. 
3.2 Measuring earnings quality 
Earnings quality is measured as total accruals. Prior empirical studies (Dechow et a!. 
1999; Bailey and Taylor 2008) find that total accruals perform better than unexpected 
accruals in detecting earnings management for firms subject to SEC enforcement 
actions (i.e., unexpected accruals measures lack power). Accruals rely on 
management discretion and judgement and come under the scrutiny of an audit. In 
contrast, measures of accounting quality such as the popular Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) measure used by FLOS (2005) are the result of estimation processes which 
potentially reduce the link between audit and accounting quality. For example, the 
Dechow-Dichev measure proposed is essentially a measure of how well accruals fit 
lagged, lead and contemporaneous cash flows. The relation with future cash flows is 
unknown at the time of assessing an appropriate EP ratio. In addition, Liu and 
Wysocki (2008) suggest that use of the Dechow-Dichev measure by FLOS results in 
conclusions that are very sensitive to additional controls for operating risk. 
As previously noted, Wong (2008) documents a positive relationship between total 
accruals and the cost of equity capital in Australia after controlling for other measures 
of earnings quality, consistent with total accruals being an indicator of lower 
accounting quality and dominating the effects of other earnings quality dimensions. 
Following Wong (2008), total accruals (TAC) is measured as net profit after tax and 
abnormals (AspectHuntleys item 8036) less operating cash flows (AspectHuntleys 
item 9100) scaled by lagged total assets (AspectHuntleys item 5090). A positive sign 
is expected for TAC. 
3.3 Measuring audit quality 
The measures of audit quality dimensions examined are the choice of a city-level 
industry specialist auditor (CL), high quality auditor switch (Aswitch-NBtoB), audit 
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effort (UnexpAF/LrgUnexpAF), and qualified auditor opinion (Opin/UnexpQalOpin) .. 
An indicator variable CL is created and assigned a value equal to I if a firm is audited 
by a city industry leader, defined as an audit firm that possesses the largest (audit fees 
based) market share in a given GICS industry city wide, and 0 otherwise. Aswitch-
NBtoB is a dummy variable assigned a value equal to I if a firm switches from a non-
Big n to Big n auditor, 0 otherwise. 
The audit effort measure, unexpected audit fee (UnexpAF), is measured as a ratio of 
actual to expected audit fee, where the expected fee is the anti-log of the fitted value 
of the audit fee model adopted from Ferguson et a!. (2006). A firm is classified as 
having a LrgUnexpAF (= I) if it is in the top decile of firms ranking on UnexpAF. 
A qualified audit opinion variable Opin is an indicator variable equal to I if a firm 
receives a qualified or modified audit opinion and 0 otherwise. We also utilise an 
unexpected qualified audit opinion measure ( UnexpQa!Opin) created for those firms 
receiving a qualified opinion by taking the difference between the actual audit opinion 
(i.e., I = qualified) and the probability of receiving a qualified audit opinion estimated 
from the audit opinion model of Craswell et a!. (2002). It is designed to capture the 
extent of surprise for companies receiving a qualified audit opinion. All other firms 
receiving clean opinions are coded as 0. 
3.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
The initial sample consists of all firms listed on the Australian ASX market in the 
period 1999 to 2004 (10,275 firm-year observations). The requirement of positive 
earnings-to-price ratios cuts the number of observations down to 3,240. Financial 
firms (GICS 4000 to 4999) are also excluded because of their special financial 
leverage. This filter further reduces the sample down to 1,502. Finally, in order to 
meet the requirement of non-missing values for every control variable (i.e., Growth, 
Beta, Leverage, Size), the sample size arrived at is I ,080 firm-year observations. As 
noted in section I, the resultant sample is one where auditing and high quality are 
likely to be in higher demand and so our sample increases the power of our tests. 
That is, this setting is likely to show economically important effects of audit quality 
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on the relationship between earnings quality and cost of equity capital for such firms 
if the effect is present. 
Audit quality measures are calculated or estimated across all listed compames 
available in the Capital Markets CRC - UTS audit database for the relevant years and 
are not restricted to the 1,080 firm year observations. Hence, industry specialist 
measures for a given year are based on the whole audit market not just those from 
I ,080 firm years applicable to that year. In order to meet the requirement of non-
missing values for total accruals (TAC), the final sample size reduces slightly from 
I ,080 to I ,067 firm-year observations. Outliers are deleted for each regression after 
conducting the conventional regression diagnostics (i.e., studentized residuals greater 
than the absolute value of 2, and Cook's D greater than 4 divided by the number of 
observations (Chen et a!. 2003)). All regressions apply the Kernel-based estimations 
for the panel data, and the standard errors reported are controlled for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations None of our regressions appear to suffer from 
multicollinearity problems.6 
Panels A and B of Table 1 display descriptive statistics. The mean and median of TAC 
are 0.087 and - 0.030 respectively. 7 The descriptive statistics for the audit quality 
measures are similar to those reported by Li and Stokes (2008) with 74% of the 
sample audited by Big n auditors and 34% audited by city industry leaders. A small 
percentage of firms switch auditors with !.12% being to Big N auditors. The average 
ratio of actual fees to expected fees is !.291 and 4% of companies have qualified audit 
opinions. 
Insert Table I here 
5 The standard STA TA commands are used to assure the regression estimator are effective in the 
presence of arbitrary heteroskedastistity and autocorrelation. All regression estimates reported in this 
study are equivalent to those produced by the robust regression and Newey-West regression. 
6 The VIF tests are untabulated for each regression and are available on request. 
7 Wong (2008) reports a mean and median for total accruals (TACOCA) of -0.0185 and -0.0239 for 
their full sample over the period of 1997 to 2006. Untabulated descriptive statistics show a mean and 
median for TAC of -0.0945 and -0.0413 respectively for all ASX listed firms from the period of 1999 to 
2004. 
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The Pearson correlation matrix is displayed in Table 2. It shows that firms with 
greater total accruals (TAC) are more likely to be smaller firms (Size), experience less 
equity growth (Growth), have lower financial leverage (Leverage), and have higher 
unexpected audit fees (UnexpAF). 
Insert Table 2 here 
4. Results 
Table 3 displays the regression estimation results for Eq. (I) to ( 4) for the audit choice 
dimension of audit quality using the City Leader (CL) measure. All regressions have 
explanatory power with statistically significant F test results. The effects of the 
significant control variables are consistent with expectations and similar to those 
reported in Li and Stokes (2008). 
Eq. (I) reports a negative coefficient for CL (= -0.0076), which is significant at 5 
percent level (two-tailed). This is consistent with the result in Li and Stokes (2008) on 
their larger sample. Eq. (2) displays a positive and significant (at 1 percent level, two-
tailed) TAC with a coefficient of 0.0462. Thus, in this sub-sample of Wong (2008) 
data, the total accruals are positively associated with the cost of equity capital which 
is consistent with his results on larger samples. CL and TAC are jointly regressed in 
Eq. (3) which displays a significant coefficient of 0.0458 for TAC and a slightly 
reduced significant coefficient of -0.0071 for CL (significant at I 0 percent level, two 
tailed). This evidence implies that the appointment of a city industry specialist auditor 
and total accruals are independent information risk factors. 
In Eq. (4), the coefficient of the interaction of CL and TAC is positive(= 0.0068) but 
insignificant. The performance of CL and TAC remain almost unchanged in this 
model compared to Eq. (3). Hence, there is no evidence that the appointment of a city 
industry specialist auditor significantly influences the positive relationship between 
cost of equity capital and total accruals. 8 
8 The sample is further partitioned into two sub-groups according to whether a firm engaged with a city 
leader or not. Separate Eq. (2) models are re-estimated in each sub-group and the results (unreported) 
show that the coefficients of TA C are positive and significant for both the groups of firms that engaged 
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Insert Table 3 here 
The regression results of auditor switch dummy, Aswitch - NBtoB are reported in 
Table 4. All regressions are statistically significant (based on the F test). The other 
auditor switch dummies (i.e., Aswitch - BtoB, Aswtich - BtoNB, Aswitch - NBtoNB) 
and their interactions with TAC are also included in the models as control variables. 
Eq. (1) reports a negative (-0.0214) and significant coefficient for, Aswitch- NBtoB, 
suggesting that firms switching to a higher quality auditor enjoy a lower cost of equity 
capital. This is consistent with the result in Li and Stokes (2008) on their larger 
sample. The coefficient on TAC is consistently positive and significant in Eq. (2) and 
(3), whereas Aswitch - NBtoB becomes insignificant after controlling for total accmals 
in Eq. (3). Eq. (4) displays a significant interaction onAswitch- NBtoB and TAC (at 5 
percent level, two-tailed) with a coefficient of -0.0621. Aswitch - NBtoB has a reduced 
(-0.0193) and significant coefficient (significant at 10 percent, two-tailed), while the 
coefficient of TAC increases slightly to 0.0801 and remains significant at the 1 percent 
level (two-tailed). The results suggest that for increasing levels of TAC, the IndEP for 
firms switching to a high quality auditor increases by 0.0180 (-0.0621+0.0801)9 while 
for others not switching to a higher quality auditor, the cost of equity capital increases 
by 0.0801 This evidence indicates that the positive relationship between total accmals 
and the cost of equity capital for firms switching to a high quality auditor is 
significantly weakened compared to that for non-switching firms. 10 
Insert Table 4 here 
with city leaders (~0.0440) and those that did not (~0.0484). A Wald test further examining the 
equality of these two coefficients suggests that they are not significantly different from each other. This 
finding is identical to the results of the interaction model (Eq. 4). 
9 A Wald test is used to examine whether p,+p,~o. It shows that the sum of the coefficients is not 
significantly different from 0. 
10 The sample is also partitioned into firms switching to a high quality auditor versus non-switch firms. 
Then, Eq. (2) is re-estimated in each partitioned sample to test whether TAC is significantly different in 
each sub-grouping. The results (not tabulated) show that for the firms switching from a high quality 
auditor, the coefficient for TAC is positive (~0.0326) and significant (at I percent level, two-tailed), 
while the same coefficient is also significant (~0.0524) for the non-switching firms. A Wald test further 
examining the equality of these two coefficients suggests that the coefficient of TAC for the firms 
switching to a high quality auditor is significantly smaller than that for the non-switching firms. 
Therefore, these results are consistent with the results ofEq. (4). 
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Table 5 reports the results of the audit effort dimension of audit quality usmg 
unexpected audit fees, UnexpAF. All regressions are statistically significant (based on 
the F test). 
Eq. (1) reports a negative ( -0.0033) and significant coefficient for UnexpAF at the 5 
percent level, suggesting greater external audit effort lowers the cost of equity capital 
consistent with the result of Li and Stokes (2008) on their larger sample. The 
coefficient on TAC is consistently positive and significant in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). The 
performance of both TAC and UnexpAF remains almost unchanged in Eq. (3). These 
results indicate that external audit effort and total accruals are independent 
information risk factors. Eq. (4) reports a negative (-0.0044) but insignificant 
interaction of UnexpAF and TAC. 
Insert Table 5 here 
A further test is conducted on LrgUnexpAF (largest I 0% UnexpAF) and the results 
are reported in Table 6. This variable focuses on the top decile firms paying higher 
audit fees than expected found by Li and Stokes (2008) to enjoy a lower cost of equity 
capital. All regressions in Table 6 are statistically significant (based on the F test). In 
Eq. (!), LrgUnexpAF is negative and significant (at I percent level) with a coefficient 
of -0.0163, suggesting that firms with greater external audit effort enjoy a lower cost 
of equity capital. This is consistent with the result in Li and Stokes (2008) on their 
larger sample. Eq. (2) has a positive and significant TAC with a coefficient of 0.0919. 
The magnitude and significance of the coefficients for TAC and LrgUnexpAF, in Eq. 
(3), are not different from that reported in Eq. (I) and (2), respectively. These results 
imply that the effect of LrgUnexpAF and TAC are independent. 
Eq. (4) reports a negative interaction (LrgUnexpAF*TAC) with a coefficient of-
0.1387, which is significant at the I percent level (two-tailed). The coefficient for 
LrgUnexpAF slightly increases to -0.0187 and remains significant (at I percent level), 
while the coefficient for TAC increases a little to 0.1000 (significant at I percent 
level). These results suggest that for increasing levels of TAC, the JndEP for firms 
with extremely large unexpected audit fees decreases by -0.0387 (-0.1387+0.1000), 
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but it is not significantly different from 0. 11 For the rest of the firms, for a unit 
increase in TAC, the IndEP will increase by 0.1000. This evidence indicates that 
greater external audit effort adds additional value to the firm through tempering the 
information risk perceived from higher accruals. 12 Tests are repeated with the 
extremely large unexpected audit fee classified at 5%, 15% and 20% level and the 
results are robust. 13 The interaction term eventually becomes insignificant when the 
classification goes beyond the 20% cut-off. 
Insert Table 6 here 
Table 7 displays the regression results of using information on whether there is a 
qualified audit opinion or not (Opin). All regressions are statistically significant 
(based on the F test). Eq. (1) reports a positive (0.035) and significant Opin 
coefficient, which is consistent with the Opin result displayed in Li and Stokes (2008). 
TAC has a positive and significant coefficient of 0.0488 in Eq. (2). In Eq. (3), the 
results for TAC remain unchanged but Opin becomes insignificant. Eq. (4) reports a 
positive and significant interaction (Opin*TAC) with a coefficient of 0.0697, which is 
significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed). The performance of TAC and Opin 
remain similar to Eq. (3). These results suggest that for increasing levels of TAC, the 
IndEP for fi1ms receiving a qualified audit opinion increases by 0.1044 (0.0347+0. 
0697). For the firms not receiving a qualified opinion, for a unit increase in TAC, the 
IndEP will increase by 0. 034 7. The evidence indicates that the positive relationship 
between total accruals and the cost of equity capital is exacerbated for firms receiving 
a qualified audit opinion. 
Insert Table 7 here 
11 A Wald test is used to examine whether Ps+P7=0. It shows that the sum of the coefficients is not 
significantly different from 0. 
12 The sample is further partitioned into two according to the dichotomous variable, LrgUnexpAF. 
Separate regressions (Eq. 2) are then re-estimated to test whether TAC are significantly different in 
each sub-grouping. The results (not tabulated) show that for the firms paying extremely higher audit 
fees than expected, the coefficient for TAC (=-0.00357) is insignificant. In contrast, for the rest of the 
firms, the same coefficient is 0.10 I 0 which is significant at I percent level (two-tailed). These results 
are consistent with that of the interaction model (Eq. 4). 
13 Tests are repeated in the sub-sample of firms with UnexpAF> I (n=629), and the results (untabulated) 
are qualitatively the same. 
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Table 8 further shows the results for the unexpected qualified audit opinion, 
UnexpQalOpin. All regressions are statistically significant (based on the F test). Eq. 
(1) shows that the coefficient on UnexpQalOpin is positive (0.0669) and significant, 
which is consistent with the results of Li and Stokes (2008). TAC remains positive 
(0.0462) and significant in Eq. (2). These results for TAC and UnexpQa!Opin remain 
almost unchanged in Eq. (3). This evidence implies that unexpected qualified audit 
opinion and total accruals are independent information risk factors that increase the 
cost of equity capital. Eq. (4) reports a positive (0.1054) and significant interaction 
coefficient for UnexpQa!Opin*TAC (at 5 percent level, two-tailed). Both coefficients 
of UnexpQa!Opin and TAC remain positive but are no longer significant. These 
results suggest that for increasing levels of TA C, a unit increase in the surprise of a 
finn receiving a qualified audit opinion leads to an average increase in the IndEP by 
0.1361 (0.1054+0.0307). Therefore, the results indicate that a surprise in a qualified 
audit opinion exacerbates the effects of higher total accruals on the cost of equity 
capital. 14 
Insert Table 8 here 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the influence of audit quality on the relation between earnings 
quality and cost of equity capital. Although prior evidence suggests that lower 
accounting quality is associated with an increase in the cost of equity capital, such 
evidence ignores the potentially mitigating role of audit quality. Likewise, prior 
studies linking audit quality to the cost of capital fail to recognize that audit quality is 
not only a potentially useful signal of itself, but also that it affects the quality of 
audited accounting data. Put simply, prior research on cost of capital effects fails to 
recognize that properties of audited financial statements (such as earnings quality) are 
a joint product of managements representations (including the reliability of the 
accounting system, internal controls etc) as well as the audit process. Moreover theory 
14 Further tests in the partitioned sample according to DUnexpQa/Opin (=I ifUnexpQa!Opin>0.5, and 
0 otherwise) (unreported) shows for firms surprisingly receiving a qualified opinion (n=22), the 
coefficient of TAC is positive (0.0640) and significant (at 10 percent level, two-tailed), whereas the 
same coefficient for the other group (0.0339) is insignificant. These results are consistent with the 
results of the interaction model reported in Table 8. 
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on the demand and supply of accounting and auditing argues that investors demand 
audits to reduce information asymmetry around the accounting information supplied 
by the firm and auditors invest in supplying audit quality in response to that demand 
and earn returns for doing so. In addition regulatory changes in the wake of high 
profile corporate collapses addressing the role of audits in the financial reporting 
process have further focussed the attention of markets, firms and investors on deriving 
value from audits. We therefore address an important gap in the literature and provide 
insights sought in the markets and by regulators to consider whether the audit quality 
attached to a firm's earnings could affect inventors' perceptions of information risk 
and could consequently influence the pricing of earnings quality. 
Utilizing total accruals as a means of measuring earnings quality and with a sample of 
1,067 firm year observations over the time period of 1999-2004 where auditing and 
audit quality is in demand by the firms, the key results of this study show that 
switching to a higher quality auditor mitigates the positive relation between total 
accruals and the cost of equity capital. Additional weight for this view also comes 
from the finding that very high levels of external audit effort, tempers the pricing 
effect of greater total accruals. The results on opinion outcomes of audits suggest that 
a qualified/a surprisingly qualified audit opinion increases the perceived risk around 
the reported earnings when there are large accruals based earnings, which further 
increases the cost of equity capital. These results hold typically in addition to the main 
effect of audit quality on the cost of equity capital documented in the prior literature. 
These results indicate that with the assurance from higher quality auditing, earnings 
made up of larger accruals are perceived to have lower risk of these earnings 
generating higher future cash flows, which lowers the cost of equity capital. The 
accrual properties, utilized to proxy for earnings quality in these studies, are likely to 
reflect both management opportunism and performance measurement capturing 
growth and increasing capacity of business (FLOS, 2005). The opportunism 
exacerbates information risk, whereas the performance measurement will mitigate 
information risk. Higher quality auditing appears to help to disentangle these effects 
as well as having an effect in lowering the cost of equity capital in its own right. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample, 1999- 2004 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics for lndEP and Control Variables 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev 
lndEP 1067 0.026 0.000 0.163 
EP 1067 0.096 0.069 0.164 
Growth 1067 0.581 0.467 0.940 
Leverage 1067 0.441 0.464 0.193 
Beta 1067 0.356 0.430 4.528 
Size 1067 18.678 18.444 2.033 
Total Assets ($ Millions) 1067 1,120 103 4,080 
IndEP = industry adjusted earnings-to-price ratio, equal to firm j's earnings-to-price ratio less the 
median earnings-to-price ratio of its industry classified by the GICS industry code; EP ~ earnings-to-
price ratio; Growth~ natural log of the fraction offirmj's current year's book value of equity and last 
year's book value of equity (Aspect item 7010); Leverage~ frrmj's total debt (Aspect item 6040) to 
total assets (Aspect item 5090). Beta ~ calculated from the firm-specific CAPM using 36-month rolling 
returns, to three months after financial year end, with minimum of 7 months of monthly returns; Size ~ 
natural log offirmj's total assets (Aspect item 5090). 
Panel B Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Unexpected Accruals and Audit Quality 
Variable N Mean or Median StdDev 
Earnings Quality Measure 
TAC 
Audit Quality Measure 
Big 
CL 
Aswitch 
Aswitch - BtoB 
Aswitch - BtoNB 
Aswitch - NBtoB 
Aswitch - NBtoNB 
UexpAF 
Opin 
UnexpQaiOpin A 
1067 
1067 
1067 
1067 
1067 
1067 
1067 
1067 
1067 
1067 
42 
0.087 -0.030 2.811 
73.76% 
34.49% 
8.15% 
3.84% 
1.59% 
1.12% 
1.59% 
1.291 1.123 0.986 
3.94% 
0.603 0.652 0.278 
A Only the values of UnexpQa/Opin for firms that receive a qualified audit opinion are reported. 
TAC ~net profit after tax and abnormals (Aspect item 8036) less operating cash flows (Aspect item 
91 00) scaled by lagged total assets; Big ~ I if firm j is audited by Big N auditor, and 0 otherwise; CL ~ 
I if frrmj is audited by city leader defined as an audit firm has the largest market share based on audit 
fees in firmj's industry in a specific city market, and 0 otherwise; Aswitch ~ I if firm} switches its 
incumbent auditor in the current year, and 0 otherwise; Aswitch - NBtoB ~ I if firm j switches its 
incumbent auditor, and the preceding auditor is non-Big N auditor and the succeeding auditors is Big N 
auditor, and 0 otherwise; UnexpAF ~ unexpected audit fee denoted as actual audit fees divided by 
expected audit fees, where the expected audit fees is the anti-log of the fitted value of the audit fee 
model adopted from Ferguson, Francis and stokes (2006); Opin ~ I if firm j receive a qualified audit 
opinion, and 0 otherwise. UnexpQalOpin ~ unexpected qualified audit opinion denoted as the 
difference between the actual audit opinion (~I) and the probability of a qualified audit opinion 
estimated from the audit opinion model adopted from Craswell et al. (2002) for those that have 
qualified audit reports, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2 (Pearson) Correlation Matrix 
TAC Growth Lev Beta Size Unex~AF Unex~Qal 
TAC 
p 
Growth -0.0583* 
p 0.057 
Leverage -0.0712* -0.0552* 
p 0.020 0.071 
Beta -0.0032 0.02 -0.0024 
p 0.917 0.514 0.936 
Size -0.0972* 0.1586* 0.4025* -0.0383* 
p 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.211 
UnexpAF 0.0534* -0.0679* 0.0692* -0.0347* 0.2300* 
p 0.081 0.027 0.024 0.258 0.000 
UnexpQalOpin 0.0069 -0.0831* -0.0593* -0.0015 -0.1571* -0.0623* 
p 0.821 0.007 0.053 0.960 0.000 0.042 
* Significant at 5 percent level (two-tailed). 
TAC ~net profit after tax and abnorrnals (Aspect item 8036) less operating cash flows (Aspect item 9100) scaled by lagged total assets; Growth~ natural log of the fraction 
of firm j's current year's book value of equity and last year's book value of equity (Aspect item 7010); Leverage~ firm j's total debt (Aspect item 6040) to total assets 
(Aspect item 5090). Beta ~ calculated from the firm-specific CAPM using 36-month roBing returns, to three months after financial year end, with minin:um of 7 months of 
monthly returns; Size~ natural log offirmj's total assets (Aspect item 5090). 
UnexpAF ~unexpected audit fee denoted as actual audit fees divided by expected audit fees, where the expected audit fees is the anti-log of the fitted value of the audit fee 
model adopted from Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2006); UnexpQa!Opin ~unexpected qualified audit opinion denoted as the difference between the actual audit opinion 
(~!)and the probability of a qualified audit opinion estimated from the audit opinion model adopted from Craswel1, Laughton and Stokes (2002) for those that have qualified 
audit reports, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3 lndEP Cost of Capital Regression Estimation with 
Total Accruals and City Leader 
lndep. Var. Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sign CL TACOCA CL& Interaction 
TACOCA 
Growth Coef -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0036 
t ( -1.46) ( -1.39) (-1.53) ( -1.53) 
Leverage + Coef 0.0315** 0.0382*** 0.0386*** 0.0385*** 
t (2.56) (3.23) (3.27) (3.27) 
Beta + Coef -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.000 I -0.0001 
t (-1.16) ( -0. 78) ( -0.81) (-0.79) 
Size Coef -0.0034*** -0.0035*** -0.0029*** -0.0029*** 
t (-3.41) (-3.74) (-2.93) (-2.93) 
CL Coef -0.0076** -0.0071 * -0.0069* 
t ( -2.02) (-1.91) (-1.75) 
TAC + Coef 0.0462** 0.0458** 0.0453** 
t (2.33) (2.32) (2.15) 
CL*TAC Coef 0.0068 
t (0.20) 
Constant +/- Coef 0.0641 *** 0.0618*** 0.0529*** 0.0525*** 
t (3.52) (3.55) (2.94) (2.94) 
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 
Adj R-squared 0.0208 0.0398 0.0417 0.0408 
F test 5.43*** 5.76*** 5.29*** 4.85*** 
*** p<O.OJ, ** p<0.05, * p<O.I (two-tailed) 
lndEP ~ industry adjusted earnings-to-price ratio, equal to firm j's earnings-to-price ratio Jess the median 
earnings-to-price ratio of its industry classified by the GICS industry code; Growth ~ natural log of the 
fraction of firm j's current year's book value of equity and last year's book value of equity (Aspect item 
7010); Leverage ~ firm j's total debt (Aspect item 6040) to total assets (Aspect item 5090). Beta ~ 
calculated from the firm-specific CAPM using 36-month rolling returns, to three months after financial 
year end, with minimum of7 months of monthly returns; Size~ natural log offirmj's total assets (Aspect 
item 5090). 
TAC ~net profit after tax and abnormals (Aspect item 8036) less operating cash flows (Aspect item 9100) 
scaled by lagged total assets; CL ~ I if firm j is audited by city leader defmed as an audit firm has the 
largest market share based on audit fees in firmj's industry in a specific city market, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4 IndEP Cost of Capital Regression Estimation with 
Total Accruals and Audit Switch Dummies 
lndep. Var. Pred. (1) (2) (3) 
Sign Aswitch TAC Dummies & 
Dummies TAC 
Growth Coef -0.0047* -0.0048* -0.0046* 
t ( -1.75) (-1.75) (-1.77) 
Leverage + Coef 0.0268** 0.0380*** 0.0377*** 
t (2.11) (3.18) (3.18) 
Beta + Coef -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
t (-0.94) ( -0.39) (-0.41) 
Size Coef -0.0046*** -0.0037*** -0.0039*** 
t ( -4.60) (-3.86) (-4.04) 
Aswitch - BtoB +I- Coef 0.0358* 0.0392* 
t (1.79) (1.92) 
Aswitch - BtoNB + Coef -0.0171 -0.0130 
t (-1.24) ( -0.95) 
Aswitch - NBtoB Coef -0.0214** -0.0117 
t (-2.14) (-0.99) 
Aswitch - NBtoNB +I- Coef 0.0049 0.0053 
t (0.25) (0.27) 
TAC + Coef 0.0757*** 0.0758*** 
t (3.79) (3.75) 
BtoB*TAC +!- Coef 
t 
BtoNB*TAC + Coef 
t 
NBtoB*TAC Coef 
t 
NBtoNB*TAC +!- Coef 
t 
Constant +I- Coef 0.0871*** 0.0690*** 0.0711 *** 
(4.52) (3.82) (3.91) 
Observations 1049 1048 1048 
Adj R-squared 0.0312 0.0594 0.0710 
F test 4.37*** 7.97*** 5.04*** 
*** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.I (two-tailed) 
(4) 
Interaction 
-0.0048* 
( -1.85) 
0.0385*** 
(3.24) 
-0.0001 
(-0.40) 
-0.0038*** 
(-3.94) 
0.0430** 
(2.11) 
-0.0153 
(-1.06) 
-0.0193* 
(-1.95) 
0.0056 
(0.31) 
0.0801 *** 
(3.68) 
0.0919 
(0.72) 
-0.0523 
( -0.96) 
-0.0621 ** 
(-2.51) 
-0.0221 
( -0.16) 
0.0689*** 
(3.81) 
1048 
0.0707 
4.26*** 
lndEP ~industry adjusted earnings-to-price ratio, equal to firmj's earnings-to-price ratio less the median 
earnings-to-price ratio of its industry classified by the GJCS industry code; Growth ~ natural log of the 
fraction of firm j's current year's book value of equity and last year's book value of equity (Aspect item 
7010); Leverage ~firm j's total debt (Aspect item 6040) to total assets (Aspect item 5090). Beta ~ 
calculated from the firm-specific CAPM using 36-month rolling returns, to three months after financial 
year end, with minimum of7 months of monthly returns; Size~ natural log offirmj's total assets (Aspect 
item 5090). 
TAC ~net profit after tax and abnormals (Aspect item 8036) Jess operating cash flows (Aspect item 9100) 
scaled by Jagged total assets; Aswitch- BtoB ~I iffirmj switches its incumbent auditor and the preceding 
and succeeding auditors are both Big N auditors, and 0 otherwise. As witch - BtoNB ~ I if firm j switches 
it incumbent auditor, and the preceding auditor is Big N auditor and the succeeding auditor is non Big N 
auditor, and 0 otherwise; Aswitch - NBtoB ~ I if firm j switches its incumbent auditor, and the preceding 
26 
auditor is non-Big N auditor and the succeeding auditor is Big N auditor, and 0 otherwise; Aswitch -
NBtoNB ~ I if firm j switches its incumbent auditor and the preceding and succeeding auditors are both 
non-Big N auditors, and 0 othetwise .. 
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Table 5 IndEP Cost of Capital Regression Estimation with 
Total Accruals and Unexpected Audit fees 
lndep. Var. Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sign UnexpAF TAC UnexpAF& Interaction 
TAC 
Growth Coef -0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0029 
t ( -0.98) ( -0.97) (-1.1 I) (-1.22) 
Leverage + Coef 0.0240* 0.0393*** 0.0387*** 0.0386*** 
t (1.85) (3.3I) (3.28) (3.29) 
Beta + Coef -0.0002 -O.OOOI -O.OOOI -O.OOOI 
t (- 1.26) ( -0.60) (-0.70) (-0.76) 
Size Coef -0.0040*** -0.0035*** -0.0030*** -0.0032*** 
t (-3.83) (-3.63) (-3.0I) (-3.20) 
UnexpAF Coef -0.0033** -0.0033** -0.0044** 
t (-2.04) (-2.0I) ( -2.05) 
TAC + Coef 0.0934*** 0.0934*** O.I225*** 
t (4.60) ( 4.6 I) (3.63) 
UnexpAF Coef -0.029I 
*TAC t (-1.07) 
Constant +I- Coef 0.08 I I*** 0.06IO*** 0.0576*** 0.0626*** 
t ( 4.08) (3.4 I) (3.I7) (3.39) 
Observations I048 I048 I048 I048 
Adj R-squared O.OI87 0.0787 0.0803 0.0826 
F test 6.23*** 8.5 I*** 8.74*** 7.78*** 
*** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.I (two-tailed) 
IndEP = industry adjusted earnings-to-price ratio, equal to firm j's earnings-to-price ratio less the median 
earnings-to-price ratio of its industry classified by the GICS industry code; Growth = natural log of the 
fraction of firm j's current year's book value of equity and last year's book value of equity (Aspect item 
7010); Leverage = firm j's total debt (Aspect item 6040) to total assets (Aspect item 5090). Beta = 
calculated from the firm-specific CAPM using 36-month rolling returns, to three months after financial 
year end, with minimum of 7 months of monthly returns; Size= natural log of firm j's total assets (Aspect 
item 5090). 
TAC =net profit after tax and abnormals (Aspect item 8036) less operating cash flows (Aspect item 9100) 
scaled by lagged total assets; UnexpAF = unexpected audit fee denoted as actual audit fees divided by 
expected audit fees, where the expected audit fees is the anti-log of the fitted value of the audit fee model 
adopted from Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2006). 
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Table 6 IndEP Cost of Capital Regression Estimation with 
Total Accruals and Large Unexpected Audit fees 
lndep. Var. Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sign LrgUnexpAF TAC LrgUnexpAF Interaction 
&TAC 
Growth Coef -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0028 -0.0032 
t (-1.04) ( -0.98) (-1.19) (-1.34) 
Leverage + Coef 0.0225* 0.0389*** 0.0370*** 0.0383*** 
t (1.73) (3.28) (3.14) (3.29) 
Beta + Coef -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
t (-1.53) (-0.57) (-0.97) ( -0.88) 
Size Coef -0.0038*** -0.0033*** -0.0028*** -0.0032*** 
t (-3.78) (-3.52) (-2.88) (-3.33) 
LrgUnexpAF Coef -0.0163*** -0.0176*** -0.0 I 87*** 
t (-3.17) (-3.18) (-3.62) 
TAC + Coef 0.0919*** 0.0926*** 0.1000*** 
t ( 4.51) ( 4.59) (4.94) 
LrgUnexpAF Coef -0.1387*** 
*TAC t (-3.67) 
Constant +I- Coef 0.0747*** 0.0581 *** 0.0510*** 0.0591 *** 
t (3.83) (3.29) (2.84) (3.26) 
Observations 1047 1047 1047 1047 
Adj R-squared 0.0213 0.0782 0.0839 0.0911 
F test 6.93*** 8.25*** 9.22*** 8.21*** 
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l (two-tailed) 
IndEP = industry adjusted earnings-to-price ratio, equal to firm j's earnings-to-price ratio less the median 
earnings-to-price ratio of its industry classified by the GICS industry code; Growth = natural log of the 
fraction of firm j's current year's book value of equity and last year's book value of equity (Aspect item 
7010); Leverage = firm j's total debt (Aspect item 6040) to total assets (Aspect item 5090). Beta = 
calculated from the firm-specific CAPM using 36-month rolling returns, to three months after financial 
year end, with minimum of7 months of monthly returns; Size= natural log offirmj's total assets (Aspect 
item 5090). 
T AC = net profit after tax and abnormals (Aspect item 8036) less operating cash flows (Aspect item 91 00) 
scaled by lagged total assets; LrgUnexpAF = 1 if a firm's unexpAF is one of the largest 10% in the overall 
marl<et in year t, where UnexpAF =unexpected audit fee denoted as actual audit fees divided by expected 
audit fees, where the expected audit fees is the anti-log of the fitted value of the audit fee model adopted 
from Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2006). 
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Table 7 IndEP Cost of Capital Regression Estimation with 
Total Accruals and Qualified Audit Opinion 
Indep. Var. Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sign O~in TAC O~in&TAC Interaction 
Growth Coef -0.0032 -0.0037 -0.0035 -0.0035 
t ( -1.39) ( -1.58) (-1.54) (-1.51) 
Leverage + Coef 0.0323*** 0.0377*** 0.0386*** 0.0406*** 
t (2.63) (3.19) (3.26) (3.41) 
Beta + Coef -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
t ( -0.97) (-0.68) (-0.65) ( -0.68) 
Size Coef -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0032*** -0.0033*** 
t (-3.85) (-3.84) (-3.47) (-3.59) 
Opin + Coef 0.0350** 0.0275 0.0168 
t (2.00) (1.62) (0.95) 
TAC + Coef 0.0488** 0.0446** 0.0347* 
t (2.43) (2.26) (1.67) 
Opin*TAC + Coef 0.0697** 
t (1.97) 
Constant +!- Coef 0.0635*** 0.0640*** 0.0553*** 0.0562*** 
t (3.71) (3.69) (3.25) (3.32) 
Observations 1049 1049 1049 1049 
Adj R-squared 0.0300 0.0431 0.0489 0.0542 
F test 5.31 *** 6.06*** 5.42*** 6.86*** 
*** p<O.O 1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
IndEP = industry adjusted earnings-to-price ratio, equal to firm j's earnings-to-price ratio less the median 
earnings-to-price ratio of its industry classified by the GICS industry code; Growth = natural log of the 
fraction of fmn j's current year's book value of equity and last year's book value of equity (Aspect item 
7010); Leverage =firm j's total debt (Aspect item 6040) to total assets (Aspect item 5090). Beta = 
calculated from the firm-specific CAPM using 36-month rolling returns, to three months after financial 
year end, with minimum of 7 months of monthly returns; Size= natural log of firm j's total assets (Aspect 
item 5090). 
TAC =net profit after tax and abnormals (Aspect item 8036) less operating cash flows (Aspect item 91 00) 
scaled by lagged total assets; Opin = I if firm} receive a qualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise 
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Table 8 IndEP Cost of Capital Regression Estimation with 
Total Accruals and Unexpected Qualified Audit Opinions 
lndep. Var. Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sign UnexpQalOpin TAC UnexpQalOpin Interaction 
&TAC 
Growth Coef -0.0029 -0.0033 -0.0031 -0.0030 
t ( -1.25) ( -1.39) (-1.34) (-1.31) 
Leverage + Coef 0.0318*** 0.0382*** 0.0380*** 0.0401 *** 
t (2.60) (3.23) (3.22) (3.38) 
Beta + Coef -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
t (-1.11) (-0.78) ( -0.82) (-0.84) 
Size Coef -0.0034*** -0.0035*** -0.0031 *** -0.0031 *** 
t (-3.69) (-3.74) ( -3.29) (-3.38) 
UnexpQalOpin + Coef 0.0669** 0.0576** 0.0436 
t (2.47) (2.17) ( 1.61) 
TAC + Coef 0.0462** 0.0407** 0.0307 
t (2.33) (2.11) (1.52) 
UnexpQalOpin + Coef 0.1054** 
*TAC t (1.97) 
Constant +1- Coef 0.0604*** 0.0618*** 0.0518*** 0.0521 *** 
t (3.54) (3.55) (3.05) (3.08) 
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 
Adj R-squared 0.0369 0.0398 0.0528 0.0584 
F test 5.48*** 5.76*** 5.47*** 6.61 *** 
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l (two-tailed) 
IndEP =industry adjusted earnings-to-price ratio, equal to finn j's earnings-to-price ratio less the median 
earnings-to-price ratio of its industry classified by the GICS industry code; Growth ~ natural log of the 
fraction of firm j's current year's book value of equity and last year's book value of equity (Aspect item 
7010); Leverage~ firm j's total debt (Aspect item 6040) to total assets (Aspect item 5090). Beta ~ 
calculated from the finn-specific CAPM using 36-month rolling returns, to three months after financial 
year end, with minimum of 7 months of monthly returns; Size~ natural log of firm j's total assets (Aspect 
item 5090). 
TAC ~net profit after tax and abnorrnals (Aspect item 8036) less operating cash flows (Aspect item 9100) 
scaled by lagged total assets; UnexpQalOpin ~ unexpected qualified audit opinion denoted as the 
difference between the actual qualified audit opinion (Opin~l) and the probability of a qualified audit 
opinion estimated from the audit opinion model adopted from Craswell, Laughton and Stokes (2002) for 
those receiving a qualified audit report, and 0 if a clean audit opinion (Opin~O) is received. 
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